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a b s t r a c t
This paper provides a comprehensive impact evaluation of the Brazilian National Service for Industrial
Training (SENAI).Weexaminewhether sucha systemcouldprovide lessons for Sub-SaharanAfrica,where
most countries face rising urbanization, high youth unemployment, and acute skills shortage. While we
ﬁnd evidence of positive self-selection into SENAI training, we also ﬁnd that it improves labour market
outcomes across the educational and race distributions, especially for young males. The effects are much
lower or even entirely absent amongst older workers and women. Finally, SENAI graduates experience
a higher degree of regional labour mobility. Such a training system could have substantial potential for
improving skills and school- to-work transition in Sub-Saharan Africa, although the speciﬁcities of the
program are likely to be hard to replicate.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Job creation in the non-agricultural sector has become crucial
for policy-makers as Africa continues to urbanize.1 This transi-
tion is occurring in the context of a strong demographic expansion
(youth bulge), only modest per-capita economic growth, huge lev-
els of informality, and a continually dominant agricultural sector
(Biavaschi et al., 2012).2 In many Sub-Saharan countries, the lack
of skills aggravates the situation of many young people without
a post-secondary qualiﬁcation. For instance, at the beginning of
this decade, almost 60 percent of young South Africans did not
reach this education level, and in many other African countries,
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: cvillalobos@utalca.cl (C. Villalobos Barría).
1 According to UNPF (2007), Africa’s urban population will rise from 294 million
in 2000 to 742 million in 2030.
2 The so-called “youth bulge” (term coined by Assad and Roudi-Fahimi in 2007)
is a term used to reﬂect the fact that the labour demand is unable to absorb a
demography-driven massive supply of unskilled labour.
the majority of the young do not even complete secondary educa-
tion (Barro & Lee, 2013; Biavaschi et al., 2012). Thus, large portions
of the rural population either remain trapped in the declining tra-
ditional sector or migrate to urban areas experiencing poor labour
market prospects, resulting in unemployment, poor standards of
living, informality, and rising criminality (Hove, 2013). Thisnotonly
hurts the affected young people, but also the economy as awhole as
skilled workers are needed to improve the country’s productivity
and international competitiveness.
One of the main challenges for African policymakers in the
upcoming decadeswill therefore be to improve the school-to-work
transition. The promotion of diversiﬁed skills for the dynamic and
growing non-agricultural sectors is likely to play an important role
where previously vocational training has only played a negligible
role in the development of skills (DFID, 2007; Oketch, 2007).3
3 In Africa, the difﬁculties associated with promoting vocational training
are mainly related to the general preference for general education, high
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2016.07.010
1062-9769/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Given this challenge, the main contribution of this paper is to
provide a comprehensive impact evaluation of the Brazilian system
of vocational training (SENAI or, more broadly, S-System) that can
serve as a reference point for African countries. As there are already
vocational training centres modeled on Brazil’s SENAI operating in
Angola, CaboVerde andGuinea-Bissau, and others in early stages in
Mozambique and São Tomé e Príncipe (Carrillo & Vazquez, 2014;
COBRADI, 2010), this can indeed be of considerable relevance as
African policy-makers consider various approaches to vocational
training. More speciﬁcally, the paper will characterize the partic-
ipants of Brazil’s vocational training S-system (mainly the SENAI)
as well as to provide an impact evaluation of S-system training
aiming to comprehensively ﬁll the knowledge gap on the conse-
quences of training on a vector of labour market outcomes, and to
better understand how and what type of training can improve the
school-to-work transition.4
This paper is structured as follows. The next section provides
an historical overview of the economic and institutional aspects of
the SENAI. It includes descriptions of the ﬁnancing schema of the
institution and the currently available impact evaluations. Section
3 assesses the determinants of vocational training participation.
Section4 is devoted toour impact evaluationof trainingonavariety
of labour market outcomes, while the consequences of vocational
education on labour migration are presented in Section 5. Section
6 concludes.
2. Economic and institutional aspects of the SENAI
The neoclassical theoretical literature on training emphasizes
that it can be an important complement to schooling in the creation
ofhumancapital for improved labourproductivity. It alsonotes that
ﬁrms only provide ﬁrm-speciﬁc trainingwhile they are reluctant to
provide general skills training as they fear that graduates of such
general skills programs will leave the ﬁrm and earn a premium for
their new skills elsewhere (Becker, 1962). As a result, general skills
trainingwill be underprovided by ﬁrmswho are unable to internal-
ize this externality. This then calls for public intervention to ensure
that such training will be provided. This can either be through pub-
lic funding and provision, a subsidy (or tax advantage) for training,
or through a collective arrangementwhere all employers fund such
training through a levy. The SENAI uses this last model as will be
discussed presently.
In theearly1940s, Brazil launchedabigeffort to industrialize the
economy in order to reduce its dependence on the trade with the
crisis-proneNorthern hemisphere.5 This generated the necessity of
a vocational education system (De Moura Castro & Verdisco, 1998).
After an unsuccessful public training initiative (see Schwartzman,
Bomeny,&Costa, 2000; Schwartzman&Christophe, 2005), the gov-
ernment ﬁnally decided to create the SENAI during the term of
Getulio Vargas in January 1942.6 It followed the German and Swiss
apprentice-training models and was organized at the national and
shares of informality and limited institutional support (Atchoarena & Delluc, 2001;
Biavaschi et al., 2012; Oketch, 2007).
4 The S-system is a collection of nine separate initiatives created progressively
over the years aiming to supply workers with the skills needed in the industry and
other sectors. It consists of theNational Service of Industrial Learning (SENAI), Social
Service of Industry (SESI), National Service of Business Learning (SENAC), Social
Service of Trade (SESC), National Service of Rural Learning (SENAR), National Service
of Learning in Transports (SENAT), the Social Service of Transports (SEST), the Brazil-
ian Service of Support to Small and Medium-sized Companies (SEBRAE) and the
National Service of Learning of Cooperatives (SESCOOP).
5 At that time, the country relied almost entirely on the imports of industrial
goods, and the substitution of imports was constrained by the lack of skills.
6 The SENAI is considered to be among the best and oldest national training sys-
tems in theworld (Wilson, 1993), having beneﬁted, until 2012,more than 52million
people since 1942 (SENAI-DN, 2012).
state levels as aprivate, non-proﬁt organization, ﬁnanced,managed
and led by industry (IDG, 1970; Wilson, 2006).
Originally, SENAI provided training in institutes and ﬁrms (on-
the-job). However, this component lost momentum over time
due to difﬁculties in ﬁnding ﬁrms willing to offer training pos-
itions. Schwartzman and De Moura Castro (2013) argues that the
legislation overregulated the apprenticeship process making it
unattractive for many companies. In fact, during the 1970s, only a
third of all needed training vacancies were available (SENAI-DR/RJ,
1979). Consequently, SENAI developed as an institution providing
training as a stand-alone operation not linked to a particular job
in a ﬁrm, necessitating graduates to then ﬁnd employment upon
graduation.
During the post-war years, stagnating realwages and increasing
proﬁts in the industrial sector led to antagonistic labour relations
that created an unfavourable environment for fostering manufac-
turing quality standards and thedemand for industrial training (see
Colistete, 2010). The stagnation of SENAI ended in 1956, a year in
which the number of new enrolments began to grow exponentially
due to the state-led industrialization effort known as “Post Import
Industrialisation” that had long-run consequences (Baer, 2007).7
Later, in 1973, the oil crisis precipitated the end of the economic
miracle (1967–1973). The economic turndown was characterized
by a shift in labour demand towards low-productivity activities,
and the expansion of the informal sector. Consequently, SENAI gra-
duateswereunable toﬁnd jobs and the reputation of the institution
was eroded (see De Moura Castro & Verdisco, 1998).
The introductionof trade liberalizationpoliciesduring the1990s
contributed to shift the economy towards the service sector as well
as the middle and high-tech industry sectors, some of which have
been highly subsidized by the government (Ferreira & Facchini,
2005;Kniivilä, 2007).8 In this context, theSENAIhas sought toadapt
its programs to actively match the labour demand of the industry,
improving its reputation. This new orientation has apparently paid
off. Recently, during the crisis period of 2008–2010, the employ-
ment rateof theSENAIgraduatesdidnot collapseas it did in thepast
(SENAI-DN, 2011) and thedemand for training in the institutionhas
continued to grow.9
However, the performance of the SENAI graduates throughout
the crisis is also possibly a consequence of changes in the selection
process into training. It is likely that over the past two decades the
ex-ante education and family background composition of trainees
have improved as SENAI has strengthened its reputation. Conse-
quently, the good performance by SENAI graduates might reﬂect
the ex-ante positive selection into training and not necessarily the
true impact of training on graduates’ labour market outcomes, an
issue we investigate later.
2.1. The ﬁnancing schema
Another aspect of critical importance is the ﬁnancing model
of the training institutions. This is because, different from the
schooling system, ﬁnancing schemes for training are much more
dependent on economic and political ﬂuctuations. From the begin-
ning, SENAI has had stable revenues since all industrial companies
7 The number of training centres doubled during the period 1964–1968, reaching
about 200 units (IDG, 1970).
8 The economic shift increased the demand forworkerswith higher levels of qual-
iﬁcation. Consequently, one decade later, during the mid-2000s, more than 85 per
cent of new recruits in the oil, machinery, and electronic equipment sectors had at
least a secondary education (CNI, 2007).
9 According to SENAI-DN (2011), SENAI’s employability rates from 2008 to 2010
were 48 per cent for graduates from learning and qualiﬁcation courses and 75 per
cent for graduates from technical courses. In 2011, about 2.5 million people were
enrolled in the SENAI in a variety of vocational trainingmodalities (SENAI-DN, 2012).
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have to pay a tax of one per cent on all payrolls that serves as the
basis for the social security system contribution.10 Nevertheless,
a fully levy-based ﬁnancing model can be inadequate in encour-
aging further developments as it happened to the SENAI during
the lost decade of the 1980s. One explanation is that it generated
a monopoly in the training market by binding enterprises to the
training institution (see Gasskov, 1994). Consequently, there is no
incentive for employers to provide on-the-job training and the lack
of competition in the trainingmarket seems tobeanatural outcome
of the funding scheme. Moreover, the lack of competition tends to
standardize technical programs, offering reduced opportunities for
shop-ﬂoor workers and informal workers.
Consistent with the promising developments of the SENAI dur-
ing the1990s, theprimacyof the levy-based income in theﬁnancing
structure started to decline in importance with the implementa-
tion of training agreements. Under this modality, the SENAI began
to implement and/or supervise employer-funded training rather
than provide it directly in their training centres paid for by the levy
(CEDEFOP, 1998; Gasskov, 1994). Accordingly, revenues associated
with the sale of training services to enterprises grew rapidly. For
instance, in Guanabara (nowadays Rio de Janeiro state) the share
of the compulsory contribution went from 97 percent in 1968 to
60.5% percent in 2013 (IDG, 1970; Sistema Firjan, 2013).
The current mixed ﬁnancing structure has some advantages
worth considering. On the one hand, the levy-based income goes
directly to the SENAI, its value is protected against inﬂation and it
provides a secure and stable funding source (Gasskov, 1994). On
the other hand, the specialization in the sale of training services
encourages the offer of ad-hoc training courses at an affordable cost
and thus to compensate the tendency towards the standardization
induced by the levy-based ﬁnancing model. The ﬂexibility associ-
ated with this ﬁnancing mixture is crucial in the context of high
informality, increasing interdependency between sectors, incor-
porating other agents (universities, technical schools, consultants)
and training modalities such as distance education.
2.2. Existing evaluations
There are relatively few (and largely descriptive) studies on
the impact of SENAI. IDG (1970) reports that during the second
half of the 1960s, a signiﬁcant amount of SENAI graduates faced
problematic school-to-work transitions and a relative stagnation
of labour earnings.11 During the next decade, the difﬁculties that
SENAI faced in ﬁnding apprenticeship vacancies were well docu-
mented inSENAI-DR/RJ (1979). This report also indicates that SENAI
graduates were already positively selected on observed character-
istics and, in spite of low real wages, they were satisﬁed with their
job situation. De Moura Castro (1979) reports high social rates of
return, at above 20 per cent of SENAI graduates after secondary
school. At the end of the “lost decade”, Arriagada and Ziderman
(1992) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant “training” premium. In particular, they
ﬁnd that trainees and school students obtain comparable earnings
when the former are employed in occupations unrelated to their
ﬁeld of study. Nonetheless, when trainees are engaged in occupa-
tions related to their ﬁeld of study, their earnings are signiﬁcantly
10 The payment is exempt from federal taxes and is collected by the National Insti-
tute of Social Security (IDG, 1970; Receita Federal, 2008). The ordinance n◦ 4.048/42
indicates that companies with more than 500 employees contribute 1.2 per cent on
all payrolls (Receita Federal, 2008; SENAI-DR/RJ, 1979).
11 As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst attempt to perform a systematic evaluation of
the SENAI. The study lacks clear deﬁnitions and evaluation criteria, and the sample
does not allow one to make inferences about the universe of SENAI graduates even
in Guanabara (nowadays Rio de Janeiro). The 64 and 47 per cent of workers aged
less than 18 and adults respectively, were not working in their ﬁeld of training in
1970.
higher than those fromthe formal education system.More recently,
Fresneda (2012) ﬁnds that graduates from a vocational technical
education (upper level) obtain a signiﬁcantwage premiumof about
30 percent, are less vulnerable to unemployment and informality,
and are more likely to enrol in a college education than those who
at the most completed a secondary education. In another evalu-
ation, Vasconcellos, Lima, and Menezes-Filho (2010) ﬁnd a wage
premium of 12%, controlling for the observables of the whole sam-
ple of individualswith completed secondary education anda return
of about 37 per cent for a restricted sample of children after con-
trolling for parents’ occupation as an instrument for unobservables.
However, SENAI-DR/RJ (1979) and more recently Fresneda
(2012) raise concerns regarding the positive selection into the
S-system, as participants tend to come from middle-income
households. Such a selectivity pattern might contribute to the
segmentation of the labour force and increasing labour income
inequality (see Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1992; Müller & Pollak, 2005;
OECD, 2005).12
While these evaluations are interesting and useful, there is no
assessment of the selectivity and impact of vocational education in
Brazil that accounts for multiple labour market outcomes as well
as for the differential impact that training may have on different
population subgroups. Based on the Brazilian household survey
PNAD 2007, we aim to ﬁll the knowledge gap by evaluating the
effect of training on a rich vector of labour market outcomes for
successively restricted population subgroups with the purpose of
reducing the underlying heterogeneity of the estimates.13 Thus, the
impacts are calculated for all individuals aged 10 or more (sample
1), individuals aged 15–29 (sample 2), individuals aged 15–29 liv-
ing in urban areas (sample 3), and for women aged 15–29 living in
urban areas (sample 4).14 Additionally, we disaggregate our results
to capture different behavioural responses to training related to
the role that the individual plays within the household (head, chil-
dren and others household members). Then, we further split our
results according to who is providing the training, whether it is
the S-system or the remaining institutions, and the type of training
received, either professional qualiﬁcation (secondary equivalent)
or at the technical-technological levels (tertiary equivalent).
3. Determinants of participation in vocational training
The descriptive information in Tables A1 and A2 (in the
appendix) suggest that S-system trainees are disproportionately
male, non-enrolled in the schooling system, heads of household,
with bi-parental families living in the northern and southern parts
of the country. Workers’ afﬁliation to a union is relatively more fre-
quent amongst those enrolled in the S-system when compared to
those enrolled in other training institutions.15 Thus, the uncondi-
tional information suggests that compared to other institutions,
12 In Europe, OECD (2005) points out that occupational shifts in the industrial sec-
tor have affected over-proportionally those graduates with a vocational education
(technical level) as well as those with an incomplete secondary education. In the
same line of criticism, Goldthorpe and Erikson (1992) and more recently Müller and
Pollak (2005) claim that low levels of social mobility in Germany are a consequence
of the highly developed vocational training system (see also Breen & Jonsson, 2007;
Buchmann & Park, 2009; Müller and Gangl, 2003; Shavit & Müller, 1998).
13 The vector consists of monthly labour earnings, monthly working hours, hourly
labour earnings, employmentprobabilities, formality levels, theprobability ofwork-
ing in the same area of training and workers inter-state mobility.
14 The estimation based on samples 1–4 provides richer information and more
accurate estimates on the school-to-work transition by reducing the confounding
effects coming from older cohorts, the geographic distribution of training as well as
the systematic differences by gender.
15 Training inother institutions refers to the rest of the training supply. Thus, it does
not represent any system in particular. In order to perform an empirical analysis, we
have to accept the partition by type of institution and training used in PNAD 2007.
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training in the S-system is more appreciated amongst workers.
Amongst trainees, the proportion of SENAI enrolments increases
from 14 to 18 percent depending on their employment status.
In order to assess the empirical relevance of the factors pre-
viously mentioned, we estimate survey design-adjusted probit
models for the probability of current participation in a vocational
training course for samples 1–3. To avoid endogeneity bias in our
conditional analysis, we consider only those individuals eligible for
vocational training without a migration background. This is only a
fraction of the population, representing approximately 55 percent
of those eligible individuals described in the appendix Table A1. As
explanatory variables, we include the age of the potential trainee,
its level of education, gender and racial background. In order to
control for unobservables, we use an index capturing the children’s
fathers’ education and the average years of education of the house-
hold excluding the potential trainee.
Additionally, themodel includes the individual’s positionwithin
the household (head of household, spouse, children and others),
whether the household consists of a nuclear family, the interaction
between females and children under the age of ﬁve, the house-
hold size, regional dummies, as well as the current enrolment in
the schooling system and the employment status. Furthermore,
we include interactions related to the labour market situation of
employees in order to control for the fact that such variables might
affect the degree in which the employment status determines the
enrolment probability. The interactions include: currently work-
ing in the formal sector, union membership, hours worked during
the past month as well as controls for the economic sector and
occupation.16
Table 1 shows the results of theprobabilitymodel by sample and
type of institution, while Tables A3 and A4 (in the appendix) show
results by type of training (professional qualiﬁcation and technical-
technological courses). While in general trainees are found to be
younger, the ones in the S-system tend to be older than their coun-
terparts in other institutions. This age effect is stronger for young
cohorts (sample 1 versus sample 2) while the rural location seems
to be uncorrelated to the age-enrolment proﬁles (sample 2 versus
sample 3).
We ﬁnd an inverse U-shaped relationship between the educa-
tion level and the enrolment probability. The inﬂection point is
found at the level of completed secondary education meaning that
individuals with relatively low and high education are less likely
to enrol in vocational training programs. Thus, our results con-
ﬁrmtheoverall positive self-selection intoSENAI trainingdiscussed
previously and already reported by SENAI-DR/RJ (1979) and more
recently by Fresneda (2012), althoughweﬁnd that thepositive self-
selection does not extend to the very highly educated. Additionally,
we ﬁnd that positive self-selection into the SENAI amongst those in
school-to-work transition, is also reinforced if eligible individuals
belong to families with higher human capital endowments.
The positive self-selection into the SENAI raises two important
issues. Firstly, there is the question of whether the positive labour
market outcomes are the consequence of more privileged initial
socio-economic backgrounds or to productive improvements truly
associated with training. Secondly, while it can be true that voca-
tional education in Brazil is not pro-poor, it is also true that the
SENAI is less selective on education than other vocational training
institutions (see Table 1). Thus, an interesting question is whether
the SENAI, despite its selectivity, is already contributing to enhance
the social mobility of the disadvantaged.
16 Formal workers are deﬁned as those contributing to the social security system
in their principal or secondary occupation, those with formal working contracts,
military, public servants, and employers with more than ﬁve employees in non-
agricultural activities.
But there may be other selectivity issues to consider, such as
selectivity by race or gender. In particular, we ﬁnd that partic-
ipation in the S-system is strongly biased against women. Here,
the question is whether women’s relative difﬁculties in accessing
the S-system are basically explained by demand factors (includ-
ing women’s preferences) or by discrimination. These issues are
important but lie beyond the scope of this paper. The ethnicity or
race of the potential trainee does not play, however, any role in
explaining enrolment. Individuals from nuclear families are more
likely to enrol in vocational training and particularly more in the
S-system. Different from the enrolment in the S-system, we ﬁnd
that women with children under the age of ﬁve are less likely to
enrol in other training institutions. This result is important since it
implies that the cost of child rearing (associated with enrolment in
the S-system) is spread acrosswomenof all ages and is not attached
exclusively to woman at the reproductive age. However, the gen-
eral gender bias in the S-system remains a serious problem to be
investigated. In particular, it is important to understand the mech-
anisms that lead women with children to enrol much less in the
system, also compared to women without children.
Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients by regions can be interpreted as regional
distortions in the supply of vocational education relative to the
distribution of workers. We ﬁnd that the S-system slightly over-
supplies the population in the south of the country (Paraná, Santa
Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul) while the other institutions over-
supply the same regions and the south-eastern region to a greater
extent (Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Río de Janeiro and São Paulo).
While being a student in the school system does not affect the
probability of enrolment in the S-system, it does strongly increase
the likelihood of training in other institutions. In our view, this
asymmetry reﬂects the fact that being enrolled in the S-system
is more associated with subsequent training (after complete sec-
ondary) while enrolment in other institutions is biased towards
integrated (simultaneous) modalities. This view is reinforced by
our results as they suggest a higher relative prevalence of concur-
rent employment amongst S-system trainees compared to trainees
from other institutions.
Amongst the employed population,workers in the formal sector
are more likely to enrol in the S-system, while their counter-
parts in the informal sectors are more likely be enrolled in other
institutions.17 Finally, workers in the service and trade sector as
well as in the production (reparation and maintenance) of goods
and services have a higher probability of enrolling in the S-system,
while agricultural workers are clearly less likely to enrol in other
(private and public) institutions.
The results above could suggest that human capital investments
in the S-systemhave higher expected returns to training, compared
to other training initiatives.18 In the next section, we investigate
this hypothesis, and provide a comprehensive impact evaluation of
training on a rich vector of labour market outcomes.
4. Vocational training graduates and labour market
outcomes
In this section, we investigate whether past vocational training
episodes are indeed effective in improvinghumancapital of partici-
pants, and thus improve their employment and earnings prospects.
Based on PNAD 2007, we evaluate whether past participation has
any signiﬁcant impact on monthly labour earnings, monthly hours
of work, hourly labour earnings (productivity) and the probability
17 The high correlation between union membership and formality may explain
why union status appears to be uncorrelated with training in the S-system.
18 See Villalobos Barría and Klasen (2014) for differences in the selectivity process



















Probability model for the enrolment in vocational training, 2007.
Population Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Variables/institutions Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect
Age −0.007*** −0.000*** −0.013*** −0.001*** −0.029*** −0.000*** −0.032*** −0.003*** −0.030*** −0.001*** −0.032*** −0.003***
Incomplete basic ed. 0.260** 0.002* 0.369*** 0.021*** 0.200 0.003 0.368*** 0.039*** 0.141 0.003 0.416*** 0.053***
Complete basic ed. 0.747*** 0.016*** 0.746*** 0.072*** 0.501** 0.013* 0.717*** 0.101*** 0.452** 0.013 0.730*** 0.117***
Incomplete secondary ed. 0.911*** 0.025*** 0.921*** 0.104*** 0.777*** 0.025** 0.903*** 0.136*** 0.716*** 0.025** 0.891*** 0.148***
Complete secondary ed. 0.940*** 0.021*** 1.036*** 0.105*** 0.861*** 0.024*** 1.102*** 0.156*** 0.799*** 0.024** 1.055*** 0.159***
Incomplete tertiary ed. 0.490*** 0.008** 0.569*** 0.050*** 0.353* 0.008 0.594*** 0.082*** 0.279 0.007 0.594*** 0.092***
Complete tertiary ed. 0.611*** 0.012** 0.802*** 0.084*** 0.331 0.008 0.873*** 0.149*** 0.272 0.007 0.837*** 0.154***
Children x father’s educ. (T) −0.320*** −0.002*** −0.110** −0.005** −0.397*** −0.004*** −0.196*** −0.015*** −0.399*** −0.005*** −0.198*** −0.018***
Avg. household education 0.016** 0.000** 0.012*** 0.001*** 0.022** 0.000** 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.000 −0.002 0.000
Female −0.203*** −0.002*** 0.073*** 0.004*** −0.308*** −0.005*** 0.029 0.003 −0.324*** −0.006*** 0.020 0.002
Ethnic I (white) −0.035 0.000 −0.037 −0.002 −0.066 −0.001 −0.036 −0.003 −0.052 −0.001 −0.043 −0.005
Ethnic II (mulatto) −0.003 0.000 −0.024 −0.001 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.01 0.001
Bi-parental household 0.096** 0.001*** 0.024 0.001 0.132*** 0.002*** 0.045* 0.004* 0.143*** 0.002*** 0.061** 0.006**
Spouse −0.085 −0.001* −0.051* −0.003* −0.140 −0.002 −0.05 −0.004 −0.115 −0.002 −0.055 −0.006
Children 0.050 0.000 0.077*** 0.004*** −0.028 0.000 0.054 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.066 0.007
Other household member −0.028 0.000 0.021 0.001 −0.120 −0.002 −0.011 −0.001 −0.088 −0.002 −0.017 −0.002
Household size −0.035*** −0.000*** −0.037*** −0.002*** −0.048*** −0.001*** −0.034*** −0.003*** −0.044*** −0.001*** −0.030*** −0.003***
Female x children under 5 0.058 0.001 −0.099*** −0.005*** 0.083 0.001 −0.115** −0.010*** 0.020 0.000 −0.112** −0.011**
Northeast −0.050 0.000 0.053 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.047 0.004 0.012 0.000 0.058 0.006
Southeast 0.041 0.000 0.207*** 0.011*** 0.122 0.002 0.168*** 0.016*** 0.103 0.002 0.166*** 0.018***
South 0.163 0.002 0.232*** 0.015*** 0.184* 0.003 0.175*** 0.018*** 0.182 0.004 0.170*** 0.020***
Midwest 0.055 0.001 0.075 0.004 0.106 0.002 0.048 0.005 0.038 0.001 0.016 0.002
Enrolled in school system 0.060 0.001 0.288*** 0.017*** 0.043 0.001 0.245*** 0.023*** 0.020 0.000 0.215*** 0.024***
Employed 0.137 0.001 −0.293*** −0.015*** 0.111 0.002 −0.477*** −0.044*** 0.071 0.001 −0.575*** −0.064***
Interactions with employed
Formal 0.133*** 0.001*** −0.081*** −0.004*** 0.224*** 0.004*** −0.073** −0.006** 0.245*** 0.005*** −0.066* −0.007**
Union membership 0.037 0.000 0.117*** 0.007*** 0.072 0.001 0.147*** 0.015*** 0.071 0.001 0.159*** 0.019***
Hours of work −0.002*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.003*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.004*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000***
Industrial activities 0.033 0.000 0.309*** 0.022*** −0.003 0.000 0.555*** 0.079*** −0.190 −0.003 0.566*** 0.092***
Manufacturing 0.107** 0.001* 0.129*** 0.008*** 0.068 0.001 0.114*** 0.011** 0.064 0.001 0.111*** 0.013**
Public administration −0.025 0.000 0.078* 0.004* −0.105 −0.001 0.039 0.004 −0.096 −0.002 0.012 0.001
Education and health 0.061 0.001 0.154*** 0.009*** −0.07 −0.001 0.130*** 0.013** −0.043 −0.001 0.115** 0.013**
Other Services 0.172** 0.002* 0.150*** 0.009*** 0.008 0.000 0.117* 0.012* 0.018 0.000 0.131** 0.015*
Managers 0.078 0.001 0.387*** 0.030*** 0.18 0.003 0.403*** 0.051** 0.264 0.007 0.495*** 0.075*
Professionals 0.027 0.000 0.441*** 0.035*** 0.248 0.005 0.601*** 0.086*** 0.323 0.009 0.688*** 0.117***
Technicians 0.168 0.002 0.538*** 0.046*** 0.431** 0.011* 0.652*** 0.096*** 0.514* 0.017 0.730*** 0.126***
Craftsman 0.120 0.001 0.423*** 0.033*** 0.289* 0.006 0.593*** 0.081*** 0.369 0.01 0.671*** 0.108** *
Service workers 0.196** 0.002* 0.459*** 0.035*** 0.339** 0.007 0.610*** 0.084*** 0.413 0.012 0.660*** 0.104***
Trade workers 0.243** 0.003* 0.433*** 0.034*** 0.484*** 0.013** 0.570*** 0.078*** 0.549** 0.019 0.630*** 0.101***
Goods, services producers 0.275*** 0.003** 0.318*** 0.022*** 0.360** 0.008* 0.416*** 0.050*** 0.425 0.012 0.466*** 0.065**
Constant −2.985*** − −2.318*** − −2.316*** − −1.810*** − −2.137*** − −2.137*** −
Observations 174872 180305 67046 70351 54798 57747
Population 83282219 85990337 31161384 32768719 25145643 26567877
Design df 5455 5403 4999 5040 4658 4691
F-statistic 18.276 82.74 10.278 40.617 8.717 27.284
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Strata 637 699 627 649 592 592
Number of PSU 6092 6192 5626 5689 5250 5283
Source: Author’s calculation based on PNAD 2007 data.
Excluded Categories: No education, Male, other ethnic groups, heads of household and northern region, non-enrolled, unemployed. Note: Samples (1) consist of individuals aged+10. Sample (2) is (1) aged between 15 and 29.
Sample (3) is sample (2) in urban areas. Signiﬁcance levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01.
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of being employed in the formal sector. Our estimations are based
on valid observations of employed individuals reporting labour
earnings. Results are extendable to the whole working population
and not only to the trained population.Most ofworkers in our sam-
ple have never been enrolled in any vocational training and are
consequently considered as a control group. Additionally, based
on the eligible population for vocational training, we estimate the
impact of vocational training on the employment probability.
Similarly to the participation equation in the previous section,
all models are estimated across samples 1–4, as well as by individ-
ual’s position within the household. Finally, by further restricting
the sample to graduates of all institutions, we estimate the differ-
ential impact of S-system training on the probability of working in
the same training area.
4.1. Methodology
In order to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) on the
labour market outcomes caused by a previous training experi-
ence, we rely on normalized inverse probability weighting (IPW)
estimators.19 The methodology was chosen taking into consider-
ation the dynamic nature of the enrolment decision, especially, its
discrete time setting where the intervention could begin at any
point in time in the past. Vikström (2014) suggests that the IPW
estimator is suitable and even preferred to other matching estima-
tors in such a context. Additionally, Busso, DiNardo, and McCrary
(2009) ﬁnds that normalized reweighting is among themost robust
estimation strategies, performing well in every data-generation
process they studied and performing best in some of them.
Consider outcome y (for example, labour earnings) and a binary
treatment variable t ∈ {0, 1} , i.e. the graduation from a voca-
tional training course provided, for example, by the S-system (or
alternatively by another institution). Additionally, assume that the
potential outcomes y0 and y1 depend on the treatment (training).
It is then necessary to obtain the mean labour earnings for trained
individuals t=1, E(y1)which is observedwhen t=1 and unobserved
when t=0.20 The treatment effect estimation problem is thus no
different from a missing-data problem.






where p(Xi) is the probability that ti =1 (to be trained or graduated),
which is a function of the observable determinants Xi. The IPW
estimator weighs asymmetrically those observed outcomes even
though the observation was not probable; through this weighting
one ensures that one gets a unbiased estimate of the treatment
effect by given low weights to those with high probability of treat-
ment (which are over-represented among the treated), and high
weights to those with low probability of treatment (which are
under-represented among the treated).
In order to properly estimate the effect of S-system training as
well as the effect of training by other institutions, a probit model
is estimated using the PNAD 2007 Brazilian household microdata.
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the individual
was trained at some point in the past and zero if he/she did not
19 IPW dates back to Horvitz and Thompson (1952). Since then, researchers have
been actively trying to extend this approach to deal with modern treatment effect
estimation problems in the ﬁeld of biostatistics and econometrics (see Hirano et al.,
2003; Robins & Rotnitzky, 1995; Robins et al., 1994, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002, 2007,
2010).
20 The observed data (yiti) corresponds to y1i for trained individuals and is missing
for their non-trained counterparts.
have any training experience. The vector Xi of determinants con-
tainsonlyexogenousvariables. That is, onlyvariables that cannotbe
affected by the current outcome (for example, labour earnings), as
well as variables thatmayhave changedbetween the training event
and the current outcome (for example, getting married). Thus, the
selection of variables determining the probability of enrolment is
difﬁcult since the temporal dimension of the training event ismiss-
ing and important information prior to the training event is also
neglected.Additionally, propensity scoremethodologies relyon the
assumption that unobservables play no or at least only a small role
in determining participation (see Dehejia, 2005; Zhao, 2004). For
this reason, the evaluation literature is abundant in recommen-
dations about the inclusion of instruments for talent, motivation
and other non-observable characteristics. Nevertheless, evenwhen
the availability of instruments is reduced, at least for children, we
instrumented those unobservables by using the education achieve-
ments of their parents.
The vector Xi consists of the age and its square, parental educa-
tion (for those in a child’s position within the household excluding
from our sample those living in non-nuclear households), gender,
ethnic background (white,mulatto or others), rural area, federative
unit and educational level. To avoid endogeneity issues and make
our estimation more reliable, we exclude currently enrolled indi-
viduals (school or training) aswell as thosewith an inter-municipal
migration background since they could move after training and
therefore bias the estimated impacts.
Table 2, and Tables A5 and A6 (in the appendix) refer to the
impacts of all vocational training, professional qualiﬁcation courses
and technical/technological courses, respectively. The tables show
the IPWestimated impacts on all variables of interest by institution
and sample.
For robustness purposes, the bottom rows in Table 2 display the
results reportedbyVillalobos Barría andKlasen (2014) basedon the
Heckit approach.21 A disaggregated view (by individual’s position
within the household) of the impacts can be found in the Appendix
Tables A7–A12.
4.2. Results
Table 2 shows that amongst those aged 15–29 (sample 2), the S-
system yields a considerably higher trainings premium than those
trained in other institutions (28.3% versus 10.4%). This result sup-
ports the idea that human capital investments in the S-systemyield
relatively higher returns.22 The fact that the impact decreases in
sample 3 (only urban areas for the same young cohort) indicates
that the S-system has an even greater premium in rural areas. Con-
trary to this, the relatively low premium in sample 1 indicates that
older cohorts do not obtain a signiﬁcant labour earnings premium.
This might either relate to lower productivity gains of SENAI dur-
ing the past decades or that these effects dissipate over time. As
only cross-sectional data is available, we are unable to differentiate
between the two hypotheses.23
Independent of the type of training (professional qualiﬁcation
or technical-technological courses), training increases monthly
labour earnings by improving hourly pay, rather than by increasing
the monthly hours of work.
21 It is worth mentioning that the Heckit estimates on the impact of S-system
training on monthly labour earnings and employability in Table 2 are consistent
with the IPW estimated effects (see Villalobos Barría & Klasen, 2014).
22 In general, our results are within the range of Fresneda (2012) and Vasconcellos
et al. (2010).
23 On the contrary, other training institutions exhibit higher returns for older
cohorts and a smaller rural-urban gap.
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Table 2
Average treatment effect of vocational training on selected variables, 2007.
Vocational training (All courses)
Monthly earnings Monthly working hours Hourly labour earnings Formality Employment Employment in
same area
S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system
Absolute effect of training (units)
Sample 1 68 109 0.4 1.7 0.30 0.60 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08
Sample 2 168 63 −1.1 2.0 0.86 0.35 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.11
Sample 3 87 54 −0.4 1.6 0.26 0.25 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.12
Sample 4 0 16 −0.2 2.0 −0.23 −0.02 −0.03 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.12
Predicted outcome mean without training (units)
Sample 1 859 892 180 180 5.50 5.73 0.57 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.50
Sample 2 593 607 182 182 3.74 3.85 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.37
Sample 3 637 645 183 183 4.03 4.12 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.38
Sample 4 595 600 170 171 4.24 4.26 0.59 0.61 0.49 0.51 0.35
Relative effect (percentage)
Sample 1 7.9 12.2 0.2 0.9 5.5 10.5 16.0 13.2 17.3 18.1 15.9
Sample 2 28.3 10.4 −0.6 1.1 23.1 9.0 16.1 16.6 12.3 14.7 30.8
Sample 3 13.7 8.4 −0.2 0.9 6.5 6.0 9.9 13.4 10.5 10.0 32.0
Sample 4 0.0* 2.7 −0.1 1.2 −5.5 −0.5 6.0 6.0 17.6 17.6 33.2
Heckit model (percentage)–(Villalobos Barría & Klasen, 2014)
Sample 1 9.3 − − − − − − − 7.7 − −
Sample 2 8.8 − − − − − − − 7.2 − −
Sample 3 10.6 − − − − − − − 6.5 − −
Sample 4 6.1 − − − − − − − 7.3 − −
Source: Authors calculations based on PNAD 2007.
Note: Samples (1) consist of individuals aged+10. Sample (2) is (1) aged between 15 and 29. Sample (3) is sample (2) in urban areas. Sample (4) corresponds to women of
(3). All treatment effects are signiﬁcant at least at the 5% level. * Not signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
The productivity gain is even more accentuated, amongst heads
of household aged 15–29 with upper level training in the S-system
training, reaching about 43% (see Table A9 in the Appendix).
Vocational training also induces higher levels of formality and
employability with no big difference existing between the S-
system and other institutions. However, signiﬁcant differences are
observed depending on the type of training (professional quali-
ﬁcation or upper level training). Amongst the trained population
aged 15–29, S-system graduates are about 30 percent more likely
to work in an occupation related to their training areas, indepen-
dent from whether it is a rural or urban job and whether women or
men perform it. This evidence supports the demand orientation of
the SENAI. Thus, the skills provided by this institution are relatively
more likely to be used in productive ways.
4.3. Gender issues
As the training impacts obtained by urban women aged 15–29
(sample 4) are in general smaller than the impacts the whole pop-
ulation in the same age-group, the results for samples 2 and 3 in
Table2 canbe considered lower-boundestimates of the true impact
of training for young men in urban and rural areas respectively.24
Our ﬁnding that, on average, young urban women do not obtain
any signiﬁcant training premium conceals the fact that women
with professional qualiﬁcation training experience lower hours,
pay rates and monthly labour earnings (−2.9% in Table A5), while
women with upper level training overcompensate a decline in
hourly labour earnings by increasing the number of working hours,
resulting in a substantial improvement in monthly labour income
(17.8% in Table A6). One explanation for these results could be
the fact that upper training might improve education credentials
but not necessarily productivity, as it is not required given the
labour-intensive nature of the occupations in which much female-
dominated work is often concentrated, where the lack of capital
24 See Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix.
generates low marginal productivities of labour. Thus upper level
female training in the S-system is associated with higher level
of employment in the formal sector, encouraging higher working
hours at the same pay. The relatively low value of the credentials
obtained by professional qualiﬁcations is consistent with the lack
of signiﬁcant returns of this type of training independently of the
training institution.
Although training has a positive impact on formality and
employment amongst women, it is important to note that this
positiveoutcome isoccurring in thecontextof extremely lowenrol-
ment chances for women relative to men (see Table 1). On the one
hand, female S-system graduates from courses of professional qua-
liﬁcations are more likely to have a job and for it to be in the same
area of training. The price for this is that they are also less likely
to work in the formal sector. On the other hand, S-system gradua-
tes from upper level courses are more likely to formalise, but with
less success in terms of employability and permanence in the train-
ing area. All these information together suggest that while women
with a professional qualiﬁcation training seem to stagnate in low
prestige occupations, their counterparts who received upper level
training (technical and technological) seem to experience higher
mobility levels, which is consistent with improved education cre-
dentials and higher labour earnings.
4.4. Rural-urban and gender-gaps
Since the returns on the accumulation of human capital are not
homogeneously distributed across gender in urban areas (samples
3 and 4) as well as across geographic areas (samples 2 and 3),
labour income inequality levels dependon the earning-gapdynam-
ics between these dimensions. In order to investigate this issue, we
use quantile regressions to assess the size of the S-systempremium
across labour income distribution by gender and by urban-rural
area (see Koenker & Bassett, 1978, 1982; Rogers, 1992).25
25 Quantile regression results available by the authors upon request.
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Fig. 1. S-system graduates’ premium (vertical) across quantiles of labour earnings, by gender in 2007.
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Fig. 2. S-system graduates’ premium (vertical axis) across quantiles of labour earnings, by areas in 2007.
Source: Authors calculations based on PNAD 2007.
Our results in Fig. 1 show that across the whole income distri-
bution, the S-system trainings premium is higher for men than for
women and it widens progressively across the labour earnings dis-
tribution. Contrary to this, the S-system premium tends to close
the rural-urban labour earnings-gap. Fig. 2 shows that across the
whole income distribution, the training premium in rural areas is
higher than its urban counterpart. Our results in Table 2 also con-
ﬁrm this ﬁnding amongst workers aged 15–29 (samples 2 and 3).
Given the fact that the impacts of training by geographic area and
genderwork in opposite directions, the impact of S-system training
on labour income inequality is rather ambiguous.
5. Training and labour migration: the role of the S-system
The possibility that vocational training could negatively affect
socialmobility by discouraging the continuation of studies is one of
the most recurrent arguments against the expansion of this type of
education.26 However, there is a gap in the literature regarding the
26 See Goldthorpe and Erikson (1992), Müller and Pollak (2005), Shavit and Müller
(1998), Breen and Jonsson (2007), Müller and Gangl (2003), Buchmann and Park
(2009).
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positive effects that trainingmayhaveon labourmigration. In order
to address this lack of knowledge, we implement a methodology to
see whether graduates of the S-system were more likely to move
to other states than their non-trained counterparts. If this is so,
losses coming from the argued occupational segmentation could be
partially compensated throughgains in geographic labourmobility.
Empirically, we adopt a similar approach to the one used
by Brücker and Trübswetter (2007), Villalobos Barría (2012) and
Giulietti, Ning, and Zimmermann (2012).27 This model of migra-
tion accounts for unobservables and allows for the costs of moving
to be inversely related to the amounts of human capital (work-
ers’ heterogeneity). In this study, we deﬁne migrants as individuals
who moved anytime within the last four years from one state of
Brazil to another one and in order to obtain consistent and efﬁ-
cient estimates of the individual probability to migrate, we employ
a three-step strategy.28 In the ﬁrst step, a probit reduced-form
model for migration serves to estimate the starting values for the
estimation; in the second step we estimate Heckman- corrected
labour equations (i.e. labour earnings equations for migrants and
stayers accounting for unobservables). Finally, in the third step, a
structural probability model (which properly accounts for earning-
differentials) explores the structural determinants ofmigrationand
distinguishes their inﬂuence by working through earnings differ-
entials and other mechanism uncorrelated to it.
Using this framework, it is possible to assess the relationship
between the S-system and the wage differential as well as the
likelihood that such a vocational training encourages inter-state
migration, thus enhancing the mobility prospects of its beneﬁ-
ciaries. The ﬁrst step model includes as explanatory variables an
indicator of past training in the S-system, the level of education of
the potential migrant, the potential experience and its square, the
age of the potential migrant as the migration propensity decreases
with age (Greenwood, 1993), gender, the number of children older
than ﬁve in the household (born before the migration time-span
to avoid endogeneity in the migration decision), indigenous status,
and controls for the regions at origin. All variables are expected
to proxy the characteristics of interest at origin (ex-ante). Based
on PNAD 2003, state-level unemployment rates at the origin are
also included to reﬂect the hypothesis that unemployment encour-
ages migration outﬂows. The log of the population at origin aims
to control for the availability of public goods.
The unbiased and non-endogenous labour earnings differen-
tial calculated in step 2 is included (in logs) together with its
square (to allow for nonlinearities) in the structural estimation
of the migration probabilities in step 3. The structural equation
also includes the same set of explanatory variables already used
in the reduced form model. The estimation is based on employed
individuals between the ages of 30 and 40 (age bracket adjacent
to the one used to study the school-to-work transition), neither
enrolled in any schooling nor training activity, who have lived in
the country since at least 2002, and without children under the age
of ﬁve. The age restrictions aswell as the non-enrolment conditions
are expected to reduce the possibility that someone could migrate
in order to enhance the available educational chances as well as
to avoid the confounding non-causal correlation that arises from
children born after migration. Consequently, it is expected that
the correlation between graduation in the S-system and migration
capture the causal effect of training on migration.
27 See Villalobos Barría and Klasen (2014) for details on the estimation procedure,
which relies on a switching regression model by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) with
endogenous switching (Maddala, 1983; Maddala & Nelson, 1975).
28 In this study, we avoid the underestimation of the coefﬁcient’s standard devia-
tions, in all models, by accounting for the complex survey design of the PNAD 2007
household survey.
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Children over 5 −0.133*** −0.136***
(0.021) (0.021)
Ethnicity 1 (white) 0.022 0.034
(0.071) (0.072)
Ethnicity 2 (mulatto) 0.074 0.083
(0.068) (0.068)
Unemployment rates
at origin (state level)
−0.022* 0.023***
(0.012) (0.006)










Population size 13962307 13962307
F 5.768 5.578
Prob> F 0.000 0.0000
Source: Author’s calculation based on PNAD 2007 data.
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Excluded categories: no education, agri-
culture, managing directors and CEOs, men, other ethnic backgrounds. Signiﬁcance
levels: * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01.
Table 3 shows the results of the reduced-form and struc-
tural probability models (ﬁrst and third steps).29 Note that the
impact of being an S-system graduate does not disappear after
29 Selectivity corrected wage equations, the distribution of the non-endogenous
potential wage differential as well as estimations allowing for unemployment are
available by the authors upon request.
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controlling for its contribution to the labour earnings-gap (reduced
form versus structural models). This result suggest that the impact
of the S-system on migration is not driven by the earnings gap
due to differential returns of training between the states where
migrants come from and the states they move to, but possibly
because its contribution to enhancing non-observables such as
information, cultural endowments and the cumulative causation
amongst S-system graduates (see Lomnitz, 1977; Massey, 1990;
Tilly &Brown, 1967).30 Put differently, training in other institutions
does not encourage labourmigration. Thus, themobility enhancing
effect seems to be a distinguishing feature of the S-system. Thus,
the S-system not only provides skills, but also enhances soft factors
such as information and willingness to move, which contributes to
their higher mobility.
Based on our structural model and holding everything else con-
stant, we ﬁnd that the S-system explains an additional migration
ﬂow of about 99,000 individuals between states, which is signiﬁ-
cant at the10percent level (Allowing forunemployment, thisﬁgure
rises up to 125,000 individuals).
6. Conclusion
With the challenges of skills shortages, substantial youth
unemployment, and a demographic bulge in Sub-Saharan African
countries in mind, the main purpose of this paper has been to
understand the determinants of participation in Brazil’s S-system
(mainly SENAI) as well as a thorough examination of the mea-
surable consequences of S-system participation on facilitating the
school-to-work transition.
The review of the SENAI experience over the past six decades,
together with our impact evaluation, provides some lessons for
Sub-Saharan Africa independently of the country-speciﬁc context.
In particular, the supply of training should not be provided within
an institutional framework that excludes the informal sector and
which is potentially subject of political uncertainty. To achieve this
goal, policymakers have to ensure that any intervention to create or
modify the vocational training system is oriented around offering
each ethnic group the same development chances, while the focus
should be on ﬁnding the proper ﬁnancing balance between ﬂexible
and ﬁxed sources (sale of services and levy) that avoids ﬂuctua-
tions and uncertainties.Moreover, the set of interventions has to be
oriented around reducing the occupational segmentation encour-
aging women to move from labour-intensive towards capital-
intensive sectors, and in promoting opportunities of internal
migration.
In our view, training institutions should not be under exclusive
control of government ofﬁcials. An independent and decentral-
ized governance structure would encourage the emphasis to be on
improving labour market outcomes of all workers (including shop-
ﬂoor workers) ensuring training courses to be demanded by the
private sector across the territory, independently whether they are
in the informal or formal economy.
30 Cumulative causation refers to the idea that S-system graduates would share
speciﬁc information that should encourage additional migration ﬂows.
The sustainability of the S-system and of the SENAI lies in
its good performance in most of these dimensions. The question
whether this good performance was achieved by accident or by
active policies is subject of further research. However, in our eval-
uation of the S-system we did not ﬁnd any sign of ethnic and
geographic inequality. We suggest that the fact that the SENAI is
present in all 27 states of the countryprovides aproper institutional
framework to achieve a territorial and ethnic balance. We also ﬁnd
that the S-system encourages labour mobility and thus facilitating
the school-to-work transition of those that decide to move. Finally,
the evolution over time and stability of themixedﬁnancing schema
of the SENAI support our conclusion on this issue.
The gender and socialmobility dimensions are the spaceswhere
theS-systemand theSENAI inparticular couldhavedonemoreover
the past decades. It is not clear that the male bias of the S-system
is exclusively a demand driven issue. In the same way, although
the S-system encourages geographical labour mobility, this is not
sufﬁcient to encourage the social mobility of the disadvantaged.
To what extent does this system of training provide lessons
for Sub-Saharan Africa, where the challenges are similar, but the
underlying conditions also differ greatly? The history and impact
of the S-system of training shows a great deal of institutional speci-
ﬁcities to the Brazilian case that may not be easy to replicate in
Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, a levy-based system is hard to
implement in countries with a small formal sector and the role of
the industrial sector in steering the training system cannot eas-
ily be transplanted to places where the industrial sector is small
and often state-owned or foreign-owned. But for more advanced
countries, such as South Africa, there is some scope for replication
as they already also have a training levy and a strong industrial sec-
tor (James, 2009). For the poorer countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,
the employer-funded parts of the program might be a more attrac-
tiveoption to consider. In that sense, it is importantnowtocarefully
evaluate the existing SENAI transplants in Africa and see to what
extent they succeed in replicating the overall success of the SENAI-
system in a rather different environment.
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Individual and household related characteristics of vocational training eligible (Sample 1).
Non-enrolled Enrolled in Vocational Training
Characteristics for Sample 1 (aged >10) – Professional Qualiﬁcation Technical and Technological Total
S-System Other institutions S-System Other institutions S-System Other institutions
Observations 320,629 1,430 8,303 255 1,984 1,685 10,287
Populations 151,223,159 691,690 4,100,807 140,673 993,127 832,363 5,093,934
Enrolment in vocational Training (%) − 11.7 69.2 2.4 16.8 14.0 86.0
Individual Characteristics (% or years)
Average Age 36.5 31.5 25.9 26.8 27.3 30.7 26.2
Female 51.4 41.0 58.2 28.9 53.6 39.0 57.3
Years of education 7.8 10.3 9.8 11.9 11.9 10.5 10.2
Without education 10.6 1.4 1.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.9
Incomplete basic ed. 43.9 20.0 30.9 0.0 0.0 16.6 24.9
Complete basic ed. 9.7 14.7 12.0 5.5 6.8 13.1 11.0
Incomplete secondary ed. 6.5 15.0 15.2 20.0 19.5 15.9 16.0
Complete secondary ed. 19.0 39.4 29.1 62.4 57.6 43.3 34.6
Incomplete tertiary ed. 3.7 4.0 3.9 5.6 10.4 4.3 5.2
Complete tertiary ed. 6.6 5.4 7.8 6.5 5.7 5.6 7.4
Children’s father- tertiary ed. 1.9 2.3 2.8 1.1 2.9 2.1 2.8
Avg. household education 4.7 5.3 5.3 6.0 6.0 5.4 5.4
Enrolled 23.5 25.2 46.6 29.0 40.3 25.8 45.4
Ethnic I (white) 49.5 52.6 52.8 67.0 59.2 55.0 54.0
Ethnic II (mulatto) 41.8 40.0 39.0 25.0 31.7 37.5 37.6
Ethnic II (others) 8.8 7.5 8.2 8.0 9.0 7.6 8.3
Vocational training in the past − 29.0 26.0 25.6 29.4 28.5 26.7
Household related variables (%)
Bi-parental household 74.2 78.3 74.1 77 73 78.1 73.8
Household size 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.7 3.9 3.9 4
Head of household 36.0 35.8 19.3 22.6 22.1 33.6 19.9
Spouse 23.9 18.6 17.1 11.3 14.6 17.4 16.6
Children 31.4 38.7 54.6 59.0 56.5 42.2 55.0
Others 8.7 6.9 9.0 7.0 6.8 6.9 8.6
Female with children under 5 6.6 5.3 5.7 4.7 5.2 5.2 5.7
Geographic region (%)
North 7.8 6.8 5.9 4.8 5.6 6.4 5.8
Northeast 27.5 20.2 22.3 8.8 16.9 18.3 21.2
Southeast 42.9 43.4 49.2 59.1 53.7 46.1 50.1
South 14.6 21.4 15.6 19.9 19.3 21.2 16.3
Midwest 7.3 8.2 7.1 7.3 4.5 8.0 6.6



















Labour market rated characteristics of vocational training eligible (employed).
Never enrolled Enrolled in Vocational education
Characteristics for Sample 1 (Aged >10) – Professional Qualiﬁcation Technical and Technological Total
S-System Other institutions S-System Other institutions S-System Other institutions
Observations 160,353 911 3,718 169 1,176 1,080 4,894
Population (with labour earnings) 75,623,882 444,438 1,854,157 94,779 595,005 539,217 2,449,162
Enrolment in voc. Training (%) 14.9 62.0 3.2 19.9 18.0 82.0
Labour markets statistics
Labour earnings (Reais 2007) 955 929 953 1,021 960 945 955
Working hours (weekly) 39.5 39.7 37.1 40.5 38.5 39.8 37.4
Union membership (%) 16.9 19.3 16.6 19.3 18.2 19.3 16.9
Formality (%) 32.2 47.4 29.9 56 45.7 49 33.1
Recent migrant (%) 7.7 8.7 8.3 8.6 9.1 8.7 8.5
Occupations (%)
C.E.Os and Managers 4.7 5.1 4.9 4.2 4.9 4.9 4.9
Professionals 6.5 4.6 9.6 3.6 8.4 4.4 9.3
Technicians 7.2 9.4 12.4 16.1 21.4 10.5 14.5
Administrative workers 8.5 11.1 14.0 14.6 20.9 11.7 15.6
Service workers 20.7 18.4 22.9 10.9 14.9 17.1 21.0
Tradesman 10.0 10.9 12.4 10.1 10.5 10.8 11.9
Agriculture workers 18.8 5.9 5.1 2.5 2.6 5.3 4.5
Goods, services producers 23.1 33.2 18.0 36.9 15.5 33.8 17.5
Military 0.6 1.6 0.7 1.1 0.8 1.5 0.7
Others 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Sectors (%)
Agriculture 18.8 6.2 5.3 2.5 2.6 5.6 4.6
Other industrial activities 0.8 0.7 1.0 2.9 2.3 1.1 1.3
Transformation industry 14.1 23.0 16.1 36.2 18.6 25.3 16.7
Construction 6.9 6.1 3.4 2.5 3.2 5.5 3.4
Commerce 17.8 22.6 20.7 24.0 20.8 22.9 20.7
Hotels and Restaurants 3.9 4.3 4.7 2.5 2.1 4.0 4.1
Transport and telecommunication 4.7 6.1 3.5 1.8 4.6 5.4 3.7
Public administration 4.8 5.6 6.1 3.4 7.3 5.2 6.4
Education, health and social serv. 8.8 6.8 15.1 11.0 19.9 7.5 16.2
Domestic services 8.1 4.2 7.1 1.5 4.0 3.8 6.3
Other collective and social serv. 3.9 6.5 7.2 3.3 4.5 5.9 6.6
Other activities 7.5 7.9 10.0 8.4 10.1 7.9 10.0
Source: own calculations based on PNAD 2007.



















Probability model for the enrolment in a professional qualiﬁcation training course, 2007.
Population Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Variables/institutions Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. Effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect
Age −0.004*** −0.000*** −0.012*** −0.000*** −0.026*** −0.000*** −0.034*** −0.003*** −0.030*** −0.000*** −0.034*** −0.003***
Incomplete basic ed. 0.248*** 0.002*** 0.323*** 0.015*** 0.198 0.003 0.291*** 0.025*** 0.139 0.002 0.351*** 0.035***
Complete basic ed. 0.615*** 0.012*** 0.621*** 0.045*** 0.493*** 0.011** 0.616*** 0.070*** 0.428** 0.010* 0.643*** 0.082***
Incomplete secondary ed. 0.745*** 0.018*** 0.737*** 0.061*** 0.681*** 0.018** 0.740*** 0.089*** 0.611*** 0.017** 0.746*** 0.098***
Complete secondary ed. 0.733*** 0.014*** 0.791*** 0.058*** 0.778*** 0.018*** 0.890*** 0.099*** 0.716*** 0.017*** 0.869*** 0.102***
Incomplete tertiary ed. 0.465*** 0.008*** 0.330*** 0.019*** 0.399** 0.008 0.398*** 0.041*** 0.337* 0.008 0.411*** 0.047***
Complete tertiary ed. 0.446*** 0.007*** 0.702*** 0.057*** 0.436** 0.010 0.863*** 0.127*** 0.395* 0.010 0.855*** 0.135***
Children x father’s educ. (T) −0.018 0.000 −0.042 −0.002 −0.199 −0.002** −0.132** −0.009** −0.186 −0.002* −0.135** −0.010**
Avg. household education 0.014*** 0.000*** 0.006** 0.000** 0.023*** 0.000*** −0.006 0.000 0.009 0.000 −0.014*** −0.001***
Female −0.103*** −0.001*** 0.103*** 0.004*** −0.196*** −0.003*** 0.061*** 0.005*** −0.203*** −0.003*** 0.059*** 0.005***
Ethnic I (white) 0.003 0.000 −0.020 −0.001 0.012 0.000 −0.007 −0.001 0.014 0.000 −0.008 −0.001
Ethnic II (mulatto) 0.060 0.001 −0.006 0.000 0.110* 0.001* 0.019 0.001 0.119* 0.002* 0.030 0.003
Bi-parental household 0.051* 0.000* 0.016 0.001 0.091** 0.001** 0.028 0.002 0.095** 0.001** 0.048** 0.004**
Spouse −0.051 0.000 −0.038* −0.002* −0.201** −0.002*** −0.027 −0.002 −0.177** −0.002** −0.018 −0.002
Children −0.025 0.000 0.058*** 0.003*** −0.098 −0.001 0.038 0.003 −0.060 −0.001 0.047 0.004
Other household member −0.085* −0.001* 0.014 0.001 −0.166** −0.002** −0.019 −0.001 −0.159* −0.002** −0.017 −0.001
Household size −0.015** −0.000* −0.027*** −0.001*** −0.020* −0.000* −0.021*** −0.002*** −0.015 0.000 −0.020*** −0.002***
Female x children under 5 −0.045 0.000 −0.092*** −0.004*** 0.009 0.000 −0.104*** −0.007*** −0.025 0.000 −0.116*** −0.009***
Northeast −0.015 0.000 0.066* 0.003* 0.014 0.000 0.090** 0.007** 0.027 0.000 0.075** 0.007**
Southeast 0.011 0.000 0.195*** 0.009*** 0.072 0.001 0.178*** 0.014*** 0.052 0.001 0.155*** 0.013***
South 0.173** 0.002** 0.189*** 0.009*** 0.173** 0.003* 0.153*** 0.013*** 0.184** 0.003* 0.126*** 0.012***
Midwest 0.077 0.001 0.122*** 0.006*** 0.086 0.001 0.142*** 0.012*** 0.045 0.001 0.101** 0.009**
Enrolled in school system 0.025 0.000 0.275*** 0.014*** 0.023 0.000 0.221*** 0.018*** 0.005 0.000 0.196*** 0.018***
Employed 0.047 0.000 −0.161*** −0.007*** 0.052 0.001 −0.348*** −0.027*** 0.030 0.000 −0.351** −0.031**
Interactions with employed
Formal 0.102*** 0.001*** −0.044** −0.002** 0.177*** 0.003*** −0.064** −0.005** 0.200*** 0.003*** −0.054* −0.005*
Union membership 0.061* 0.001 0.093*** 0.004*** 0.063 0.001 0.075* 0.006* 0.078 0.001 0.089** 0.008**
Hours of work −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.003*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.003*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000***
Industrial activities −0.152 −0.001 0.200** 0.010** 0.246 0.005 0.195 0.017 −0.057 −0.001 0.242* 0.025
Manufacturing 0.083** 0.001* 0.100*** 0.005*** 0.032 0.000 0.045 0.004 0.038 0.001 0.045 0.004
Public administration 0.000 0.000 0.117*** 0.006*** 0.007 0.000 0.089 0.007 0.02 0.000 0.096* 0.009
Education and health −0.077 −0.001 0.142*** 0.007*** −0.274*** −0.003*** 0.103** 0.008** −0.258** −0.003*** 0.096** 0.009*
Other Services 0.238*** 0.003*** 0.210*** 0.011*** −0.053 −0.001 0.126** 0.011** −0.034 −0.001 0.142*** 0.014**
Managers 0.082 0.001 0.315*** 0.018*** 0.225 0.004 0.381*** 0.040*** 0.271 0.006 0.358** 0.041*
Professionals 0.067 0.001 0.275*** 0.015*** 0.086 0.001 0.418*** 0.044*** 0.123 0.002 0.396*** 0.046**
Technicians 0.091 0.001 0.347*** 0.021*** 0.351*** 0.007* 0.473*** 0.052*** 0.396** 0.010 0.468*** 0.057**
Craftsman 0.044 0.000 0.235*** 0.013*** 0.247** 0.004 0.370*** 0.037*** 0.288 0.006 0.339** 0.037**
Service workers 0.133* 0.001* 0.326*** 0.018*** 0.310*** 0.006* 0.463*** 0.048*** 0.335* 0.007 0.422*** 0.047**
Trade workers 0.138* 0.002 0.307*** 0.017*** 0.387*** 0.008** 0.409*** 0.042*** 0.401** 0.010 0.377*** 0.042**
Goods, services producers 0.232*** 0.003*** 0.214*** 0.011*** 0.340*** 0.006** 0.308*** 0.028*** 0.353* 0.008 0.268** 0.027*
Constant −3.043*** − −2.306*** − −2.501*** − −1.755*** − −2.304*** − −1.680*** −
Observations 322059 328932 101208 104889 83768 87052
Population 151914849 155323966 46621182 48394307 38100357 39677564
Design df 6035 6044 5427 5453 5021 5047
F-statistic 19.08 97.25 10.01 42.57 8.28 30.30
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of Strata 753 754 695 695 628 628
Number of PSU 6788 6798 6122 6148 5649 5675
Source: Author’s calculation based on PNAD 2007 data.
Excluded Categories: No education, Male, other ethnic groups, heads of household and northern region, non-enrolled, unemployed. Note: Samples (1) consist of individuals aged+10. Sample (2) is (1) aged between 15 and 29.



















Probability model for the enrolment in a technical or technological training course, 2007.
Population Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Variables/institutions Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. Effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect Coefﬁcient Mg. effect
Age −0.014*** −0.000*** −0.014*** −0.000*** −0.039*** −0.000*** −0.023*** −0.001*** −0.037*** −0.000*** −0.023*** −0.001***
Years of schooling 0.094*** 0.000*** 0.116*** 0.001*** 0.085*** 0.000*** 0.082*** 0.002*** 0.081*** 0.000*** 0.072*** 0.002***
Children x father’s educ. (T) −0.466** −0.000*** −0.245*** −0.001 −0.743** −0.001*** −0.243*** −0.004*** −0.716** −0.001*** −0.225*** −0.005***
Avg. household education 0.019* 0.000* 0.016*** 0.000*** 0.011 0.000 0.031*** 0.001*** −0.001 0.000 0.028*** 0.001***
Female −0.297*** −0.000*** 0.009 0.000 −0.366*** −0.001*** 0.007 0.000 −0.339*** −0.001*** 0.000 0.000
Ethnic I (white) −0.004 0.000 −0.108*** −0.001*** −0.006 0.000 −0.101** −0.002** −0.011 0.000 −0.095** −0.003**
Ethnic II (mulatto) −0.088 0.000 −0.068* −0.000* −0.038 0.000 −0.082* −0.002* −0.045 0.000 −0.076 −0.002
Bi-parental household 0.093 0.000 −0.012 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.158** 0.000** 0.017 0.000
Spouse 0.003 0.000 −0.076** −0.000** 0.178 0.001 −0.037 −0.001 0.163 0.001 −0.053 −0.001
Children 0.260*** 0.000** 0.106*** 0.001*** 0.321*** 0.001*** 0.171*** 0.004*** 0.353*** 0.001*** 0.175*** 0.005***
Other household member 0.167 0.000 −0.046 0.000 0.142 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.198 0.001 0.005 0.000
Household size −0.071*** −0.000*** −0.026*** −0.000*** −0.087*** −0.000*** −0.042*** −0.001*** −0.095*** −0.000*** −0.047*** −0.001***
Female x children under 5 0.186 0.000 −0.017 0.000 0.195 0.001 −0.077 −0.002 0.204 0.001 −0.048 −0.001
Northeast −0.182 −0.000* −0.019 0.000 −0.112 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.058 0.002
Southeast 0.068 0.000 0.127*** 0.001*** 0.201 0.001 0.195*** 0.005*** 0.306** 0.001** 0.216*** 0.006***
South 0.069 0.000 0.188*** 0.001*** 0.174 0.001 0.251*** 0.007*** 0.271** 0.001 0.258*** 0.009***
Midwest 0.054 0.000 −0.114** −0.001** 0.152 0.000 −0.147** −0.003*** 0.21 0.001 −0.124* −0.003**
Enrolled in school system −0.084 0.000 0.147*** 0.001*** −0.082 0.000 0.062* 0.001* −0.075 0.000 0.059* 0.002
Employed −0.023 0.000 −0.345*** −0.002** 0.132 0.000 −0.605*** −0.015** −0.052 0.000 −0.580* −0.019
Interactions with employed
Formal 0.137** 0.000** −0.011 0.000 0.255*** 0.001** 0.033 0.001 0.284*** 0.001** 0.043 0.001
Union membership −0.043 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.021 0.001
Hours of work −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.003*** −0.000*** 0.000 0.000 −0.003*** −0.000*** 0.000 0.000
Industrial activities 0.454** 0.001 0.473*** 0.005*** − − 0.604*** 0.028*** − − 0.577*** 0.031**
Manufacturing 0.259*** 0.000** 0.184*** 0.001*** 0.334*** 0.001** 0.185*** 0.005*** 0.295*** 0.001** 0.160*** 0.005***
Public administration −0.049 0.000 0.099* 0.001* −0.279 −0.000* 0.102 0.003 −0.338 −0.001** 0.069 0.002
Education and health 0.177 0.000 0.163*** 0.001*** 0.243 0.001 0.200*** 0.006*** − − 0.164** 0.005**
Other Services 0.104 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.053 0.001 − − 0.041 0.001
Managers −0.142 0.000 0.162 0.001 −0.147 0.000 0.364 0.013 − − 0.343 0.014
Professionals −0.443* −0.000*** −0.047 0.000 −0.348 −0.001* 0.242 0.007 − − 0.242 0.009
Technicians 0.078 0.000 0.496*** 0.006** −0.001 0.000 0.669*** 0.032* 0.314 0.002 0.622* 0.033
Craftsman −0.001 0.000 0.391*** 0.004** −0.011 0.000 0.624*** 0.027* 0.235 0.001 0.614* 0.031
Service workers 0.123 0.000 0.419*** 0.004** 0.096 0.000 0.560*** 0.022* 0.349* 0.002 0.526* 0.024
Trade workers 0.073 0.000 0.307** 0.003 0.205 0.001 0.473** 0.018 0.419** 0.003 0.397 0.017
Goods, services producers 0.223 0.000 0.284** 0.002* 0.199 0.001 0.463** 0.016 0.438** 0.003 0.425 0.017
Constant −3.565*** − −3.297*** − −2.940*** − −2.714*** − −2.897*** − −2.578*** −
Observations 320884 322613 100313 101868 82985 84368
Population 151363832 152216286 46216520 46971071 37747149 38412456
Design df 6032 6032 5422 5430 5017 5025
F-statistic 35.195 130.67 16.29 50.00 12.729 34.919
p-value 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of Strata 754 753 697 695 629 628
Number of PSU 6786 6785 6119 6125 5646 5653
Source: Author’s calculation based on PNAD 2007 data.
Excluded Categories: No education, Male, other ethnic groups, heads of household and northern region, non-enrolled, unemployed. Note: Samples (1) consist of individuals aged+10. Sample (2) is (1) aged between 15 and 29.



















Average treatment effect of professional qualiﬁcation training on selected variables, 2007.
Professional Qualiﬁcation
Monthly earnings Monthly working hours Hourly labour earnings Formality Employment Employment in
same area
S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system
Absolute effect of training (units)
Sample 1 68 117 0.6 2.4 0.34 0.59 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.07
Sample 2 157 52 −1.1 2.9 0.84 0.24 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.12
Sample 3 84 40 −1.3 2.5 0.28 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.13
Sample 4 −17 16 −2.3 2.7 −0.22 −0.01 −0.05 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.13
Predicted outcome mean without training (units)
Sample 1 856 864 180 180 5.47 5.55 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.51
Sample 2 591 596 182 182 3.73 3.77 0.54 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.35
Sample 3 634 634 183 183 4.03 4.04 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.36
Sample 4 595 591 170 170 4.23 4.20 0.59 0.60 0.49 0.50 0.33
Relative effect (percentage)
Sample 1 8.0 13.6 0.6 2.4 6.3 10.6 16.2 13.4 17.3 17.3 13.4
Sample 2 26.5 8.7 −1.1 2.9 22.4 6.3 16.1 17.4 12.3 14.6 34.8
Sample 3 13.2 6.3 −1.3 2.5 7.1 2.7 9.6 13.9 11.2 9.4 36.5
Sample 4 −2.9 2.6 −2.3 2.7 −5.2 −0.3 −8.1 4.4 20.4 17.1 40.0
Source: Authors calculations based on PNAD 2007.




















Average treatment effect of technical and technological training on selected variables, 2007.
Technical and Technological level
Monthly earnings Monthly working hours Hourly labour earnings Formality Employment Employment in
same area
S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system Other inst. S-system
Absolute effect of training (units)
Sample 1 65 86 −1.3 −0.3 0.02 0.64 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.12
Sample 2 235 105 −0.8 −1.2 1.01 0.77 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09
Sample 3 104 106 4.6 −1.5 0.14 0.75 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.09
Sample 4 106 18 12.7 −0.3 −0.34 −0.05 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.10 −0.05
Predicted outcome mean without training (units)
Sample 1 880 970 181 180 5.66 6.24 0.58 0.62 0.57 0.58 0.53
Sample 2 605 649 182 182 3.79 4.14 0.55 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.48
Sample 3 654 686 183 182 4.08 4.40 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.49
Sample 4 595 631 170 171 4.28 4.47 0.60 0.64 0.60 0.53 0.46
Relative effect (percentage)
Sample 1 7.4 8.9 −0.7 −0.2 0.3 10.2 14.4 12.5 16.9 20.0 23.2
Sample 2 38.8 16.1 −0.4 −0.7 26.6 18.5 16.5 13.7 12.2 15.5 18.1
Sample 3 15.9 15.4 2.5 −0.8 3.4 17.1 11.4 11.6 7.0 12.1 18.2
Sample 4 17.8 2.8 7.5 −0.2 −7.8 −1.0 14.1 11.2 3.1 19.0 −11.3
Source: Authors calculations based on PNAD 2007.




















IPW average treatment effects of vocational training on labour monthly earnings by institution, household position and aggregation samples (1–4), Reais of 2007 and percentages over non-trained individuals.
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 68 117 99 179 32 67
Sample 2 157 52 257 50 23 60
Sample 3 84 40 120 47 0 37
Sample 4 −17 16 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 8.0 13.6 9.8 17.5 4.9 10.2
Sample 2 26.5 8.7 38.2 7.3 4.0 10.3
Sample 3 13.2 6.3 16.3 6.4 0.0 5.9
Sample 4 −2.9 2.6 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 65 86 148 71 158 116
Sample 2 235 105 303 160 126 83
Sample 3 104 106 40 175 143 77
Sample 4 106 18 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 7.4 8.9 13.9 6.0 23.7 16.4
Sample 2 38.8 16.1 44.0 20.9 21.5 13.3
Sample 3 15.9 15.4 5.3 21.1 22.7 11.7
Sample 4 17.8 2.8 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
All levels Sample 1 68 109 104 149 52 79
Sample 2 168 63 262 72 40 65
Sample 3 87 54 110 73 24 46
Sample 4 0 16 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
All levels Sample 1 7.9 12.2 10.3 13.9 7.9 11.8
Sample 2 28.3 10.4 38.9 10.3 6.9 11.0
Sample 3 13.7 8.4 14.9 9.7 3.8 7.3
Sample 4 0.0 2.7 − − − −
Source: Authors calculations based on PNAD 2007.



















IPW average treatment effects of vocational training on monthly working hours by institution, household position and aggregation samples (1–4), hours and percentages over non-trained individuals.
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 0.6 2.4 2.6 4.4 1.0 3.6
Sample 2 −1.1 2.9 −3.6 2.9 2.7 3.5
Sample 3 −1.3 2.5 −2.7 0.9 −2.8 2.8
Sample 4 −2.3 2.7 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 0.3 1.3 1.4 2.3 0.5 1.9
Sample 2 −0.6 1.6 −1.9 1.5 1.5 1.9
Sample 3 −0.7 1.4 −1.4 0.5 −1.5 1.5
Sample 4 −1.4 1.6 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 −1.3 −0.3 2.6 1.7 3.1 −2.4
Sample 2 −0.8 −1.2 −5.3 0.0 −0.9 −0.4
Sample 3 4.6 −1.5 −5.4 −2.0 4.7 0.1
Sample 4 12.7 −0.3 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 −0.7 −0.2 1.4 0.9 1.7 −1.3
Sample 2 −0.4 −0.7 −2.7 0.0 −0.5 −0.2
Sample 3 2.5 −0.8 −2.8 −1.1 2.6 0.0
Sample 4 7.5 −0.2 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
All levels Sample 1 0.4 1.7 2.6 3.6 1.2 2.0
Sample 2 −1.1 2.0 −3.8 2.3 2.1 2.6
Sample 3 −0.4 1.6 −3.0 0.3 −1.5 2.2
Sample 4 −0.2 2.0 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
All levels Sample 1 0.2 0.9 1.4 1.9 0.7 1.1
Sample 2 −0.6 1.1 −2.0 1.2 1.2 1.4
Sample 3 −0.2 0.9 −1.6 0.2 −0.8 1.2
Sample 4 −0.1 1.2 − − − −
Source: Authors calculations based on PNAD 2007.



















IPW average treatment effects of vocational training on hourly wages by institution, household position and aggregation samples (1–4), Reais of 2007 and percentages over non-trained individuals.
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 0.34 0.59 0.46 0.73 0.45 0.25
Sample 2 0.84 0.24 1.59 0.20 −0.22 0.21
Sample 3 0.28 0.11 0.69 0.22 −0.34 −0.02
Sample 4 −0.22 −0.01 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 6.3 10.6 7.4 11.4 10.6 5.7
Sample 2 22.4 6.3 41.4 5.1 −5.8 5.4
Sample 3 7.1 2.7 16.4 5.3 −8.4 −0.5
Sample 4 −5.2 −0.3 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 0.02 0.64 0.47 0.17 1.09 1.30
Sample 2 1.01 0.77 1.68 1.67 0.54 0.54
Sample 3 0.14 0.75 0.18 1.97 0.38 0.48
Sample 4 −0.34 −0.05 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 0.3 10.2 7.1 2.3 25.3 28.0
Sample 2 26.6 18.5 42.9 38.3 14.2 13.0
Sample 3 3.4 17.1 4.1 41.8 9.1 10.8
Sample 4 −7.8 −1.0 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
All levels Sample 1 0.30 0.60 0.46 0.57 0.45 0.51
Sample 2 0.86 0.35 1.60 0.49 −0.09 0.28
Sample 3 0.26 0.25 0.62 0.58 −0.22 0.09
Sample 4 −0.23 −0.02 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
All levels Sample 1 5.5 10.5 7.3 8.5 13.0 11.6
Sample 2 23.1 9.0 41.6 12.4 −2.4 7.1
Sample 3 6.5 6.0 14.8 13.4 −5.4 2.1
Sample 4 −5.5 −0.5 − − − −
Source: Authors calculations based on PNAD 2007.



















IPW average treatment effects of vocational training on formality likelihood by institution, household position and aggregation samples (1–4), percentage points and percentages over non-trained individuals.
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.12
Sample 2 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.12
Sample 3 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.09
Sample 4 −0.05 0.03 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 16.2 13.4 17.6 12.4 16.8 20.8
Sample 2 16.1 17.4 11.3 17.7 17.6 22.0
Sample 3 9.6 13.9 4.9 17.6 13.4 15.7
Sample 4 −8.1 4.4 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.11
Sample 2 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10
Sample 3 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.08
Sample 4 0.56 0.07 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 14.4 12.5 19.5 11.0 10.5 18.9
Sample 2 16.5 13.7 13.3 15.1 15.2 15.9
Sample 3 11.4 11.6 6.1 15.7 23.0 −4.9
Sample 4 76.8 11.2 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
All levels Sample 1 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.12
Sample 2 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.12
Sample 3 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.09
Sample 4 −0.03 0.04 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
All levels Sample 1 16.0 13.2 17.8 12.0 15.8 20.3
Sample 2 16.1 16.6 11.6 17.2 17.2 20.6
Sample 3 9.9 13.4 5.1 17.2 15.0 15.1
Sample 4 6.0 6.0 − − − −
Source: Authors calculations based on PNAD 2007.



















IPW average treatment effects of vocational training on employment probability by institution, household position and aggregation samples (1-4), percentage points and percentages over non-trained individuals.
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.08
Sample 2 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.07
Sample 3 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.05
Sample 4 0.10 0.09 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 17.3 17.3 10.2 5.3 4.6 13.5
Sample 2 12.3 14.6 3.2 2.5 1.9 12.1
Sample 3 11.2 9.4 1.0 2.5 11.4 7.4
Sample 4 20.4 17.1 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.08
Sample 2 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.09
Sample 3 0.04 0.08 −0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07
Sample 4 0.02 0.10 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 16.9 20.0 12.9 6.8 13.8 13.8
Sample 2 12.2 15.5 3.0 2.8 6.4 14.3
Sample 3 7.0 12.1 −2.1 2.2 7.0 −3.7
Sample 4 3.1 19.0 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
All levels Sample 1 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.08
Sample 2 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07
Sample 3 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.05
Sample 4 0.09 0.09 − − − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions S-system Other institutions
All levels Sample 1 17.3 18.1 10.5 5.7 6.1 13.6
Sample 2 12.3 14.7 3.2 2.5 2.7 12.6
Sample 3 10.5 10.0 0.6 2.4 10.7 8.3
Sample 4 17.6 17.6 − − − −
Source: Authors calculations based on PNAD 2007.



















IPW average treatment effects of S-system vocational training on the probability of being employment in the same area of training, by household position and aggregation samples (1–4), percentage points and percentages over
trained individuals in other institutions.
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system over other vocational training institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 0.07 0.04 0.10
Sample 2 0.12 0.09 0.12
Sample 3 0.13 0.09 0.12
Sample 4 0.13 − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system over other vocational training institutions
Professional qualiﬁcation Sample 1 13.4 6.8 28.0
Sample 2 34.8 18.3 35.6
Sample 3 36.5 18.0 36.6
Sample 4 40.0 − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system over other vocational training institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 0.12 0.07 0.10
Sample 2 0.09 −0.08 0.07
Sample 3 0.09 −0.06 0.06
Sample 4 −0.05 − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system over other vocational training institutions
Technical and Technological levels Sample 1 23.2 12.4 20.7
Sample 2 18.1 −14.9 14.6
Sample 3 18.2 −11.9 12.8
Sample 4 −11.3 − −
Whole Heads Children
Absolute effect S-system over other vocational training institutions
All levels Sample 1 0.08 0.07 0.10
Sample 2 0.11 0.07 0.10
Sample 3 0.12 0.07 0.10
Sample 4 0.12 − −
Whole Heads Children
Relative effect (%) S-system over other vocational training institutions
All levels Sample 1 15.9 11.3 25.1
Sample 2 30.8 15.2 28.7
Sample 3 32.0 15.4 29.1
Sample 4 33.2 − −
Source: Authors calculations based on PNAD 2007.
Note: Samples (1) consist of individuals aged+10. Sample (2) is (1) aged between 15 and 29. Sample (3) is sample (2) in urban areas. Sample (4) corresponds to women of (3).
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